



THE FRENCH AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEMS DISTINGUISHED
The existence in France of a body of administrative law (le droit
administratif), separate and distinct from the civil law, dealing, in the
main, with the competence of the administrative authorities and regu-
lating their relations with one another and with private individuals,
together with a separate and distinct body of tribunals charged with
deciding controversies between the administration and private persons
and of resolving conflicts of competence between the administrative and
the civil courts, distinguishes fundamentally the administrative and legal
system of France from that of Anglo-Saxon countries. In these latter
countries there are, to be sure, well settled rules of law and practice
regarding the competence of the administrative authorities, the relations
between them and private individuals and as to the responsibility of the
State and its agents for injuries to private persons, but they do not
constitute in their ensemble a separate and distinct body of law as the
French droit administratif does. Dicey even goes to the length of
asserting that the French droit administratif and the very principles on
which it rests are quite unknown to English and American judges and
lawyers.' He does not, of course, deny the existence in America and
England of administrative law but rather the French conception of it
as a body of "official" law, entirely distinct and separate from the rest
of the public law, based on different principles from those which deter-
mine the relations between private individuals, and applied by a special
class of tribunals distinct from the ordinary civil courts.
2  Dicey empha-
sizes the fact that in these latter countries public officials from the
highest to the lowest are subject to the same law which governs private
individuals that is the "ordinary law of the land"; that they are subject
to the same responsibility as are private individuals, for the injuries
which their official or unofficial acts may cause to others and that this
responsibility is enforceable in the ordinary civil or criminal courts by a
suit against the official committing the wrong. In the main this is a
true statement but it is not entirely so. In fact there is no country in
'Law of the Constitution (2d ed. i88o) 182.
'See also his article, The Droit Administratif in Modern French Law (igoi)
17 L. QUART. REv. 302 ff. Compare also i Goodnow, Comparative Administrative
Law (19o3) 6; - Redlich and Hurst, English Local Government (19o3) 365;
Ashley, Local and Central Government (i9o6) ch. 8; Sidgwick, Elements of
Politics (1897) 505-507; 2 Lowell, The Government of England (i9o8) 490; I
Lowell, Governments and Parties in Central Europe (1897) 55.
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which a private individual is treated as if he were on an absolutely equal
footing with the State,3 where the rights, privileges and prerogatives of
public officials are wholly determined by the same law as that which
determines the rights of individuals4 or where a public officer may be
sued by a private individual without restriction.5 It may be added that
there are in both England and the United States various claims courts,
commissions, boards and departments which exercise quasi-judicial
powers and which frequently decide controversies between private indi-
viduals and the government, settle claims, award compensation for
damages, determine disputes relative to the powers and duties of local
authorities and the like.6 These bodies bear some resemblance to the
French administrative courts as regards the nature of their jurisdiction,
their organization, their methods of procedure and in being what Dicey
calls "extraordinary official" courts for the administration of "official"
law. It is not entirely correct therefore to say that the French notion
of administrative law is alien to the spirit and traditions of American
and English institutions and to English and American practice.7
Another striking difference between the French droit administratif
and the administrative law of Anglo-Saxon countries, so far as there is
any, is that the former is almost entirely jurisprudential (to employ a
French term) ; that is to say, it is case law.3 It is largely the work of
the council of state (the supreme administrative court of France), of
the tribunal of conflicts (a special tribunal for deciding conflicts of
competence between the civil and administrative courts) and to some
extent of the court of cassation (the supreme judicial court of France).
In this respect it bears a striking resemblance to the common law of
England and the United States. Even those who like Dicey have criti-
cized the French system of administrative law as fundamentally wrong
have expressed their admiration for the skill and ingenuity which the
council of state, in particular, has shown in building up from year to
year a vast system of jurisprudence9 and in devising new remedies for
3I Goodnow, op. cit. II, 12.
Compare Parker, State and Offlcial Liability (19o6) ig HAv. L. Rv. 335, 337,
339.
' Compare, for example, the English Public Authorities Protection Act of 1893
(56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), which penalizes by the imposition of costs the individual
whose suit against a public officer is unsuccessful. This and other provisions of
the Act indicate a growing feeling in England that public officers should be given
a larger protection against vexatious and unfounded damage suits by private
persons; in short, that it is impossible to leave the individual on an equal footing
with public officers when he is dealing with the State.
'As to the United States, see Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals (1923) 36
HARv. L. REv. 405 if, 583 if. As to England, compare Ashley, op. cit. 306, and 2
Redlich and Hurst, op. cit. 365.
'Compare Parker, op. cit. 337.
'This fact constitutes one of the grounds of Dicey's criticism of the whole
system of the droit administratif. Op. cit. i89.
"I use the term "jurisprudence" throughout this article in the French sense as
descriptive of the body of case law built up by the courts.
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the protection of private individuals against the arbitrary and illegal
conduct of the administrative authorities. He even admits that the
system has certain merits which Englishmen do not always recognize.
I venture to say from a somewhat extensive study of the jurispru-
dence of the council of state that the system of administrative law
which has been slowly built up, in the main, by its decisions deserves
more admiration than has ever been bestowed upon it by English and
American jurists, not merely because it is in itself a monument of judi-
cial construction but because of its extremely progressive and liberal
character. It can now be said without possibility of contradiction that
there is no other country where the rights of private individuals are so
well protected against the arbitrariness, the abuses and the illegal
conduct of the administrative authorities and where they are so sure of
receiving reparation for injuries sustained on account of such conduct.
This is virtually the unanimous opinion of French jurists and writers on
administrative law and it is entirely justified. The council of state,
which has come to be regarded as the principal guardian and protector
of the rights and liberties of the people against a bureaucratic and
highly centralized administration, occupies a place in the public esteem
and confidence of the French which is higher even than that which the
Supreme Court of the United States enjoys among the American people.
It enjoys greater public confidence than the court of cassation or the
inferior judicial courts because it has shown more solicitude for uphold-
ing the rights of individuals in their controversies with the govern-
ment,'0 its decisions are more often based upon equity, its jurispru-
dence has been more liberal and progressive especially in devising reme-
dies for the protection of the individual against illegal or arbitrary
administrative conduct and because recourse to it is simpler and less
expensive." For these reasons whenever the individual has a choice
he will usually bring his action before the council of state rather than
before a civil court.
1 It is necessary to remark in this connection that the administrative courts do
not have jurisdiction over all controversies between the administration and private
individuals; that is, not all of the contentieux administratif has been reserved to
them. A good part of it in fact is exercised by the judicial courts. The
separation between "administration" and "justice," although a fundamental
principle of French law, is not therefore complete. Thus the judicial courts have
jurisdiction of controversies in cases of damages resulting from the personal
fault of the administrative agent, cases of expropriation, acts relating to the
management of the public domain, the application of police ordinances and those
relative to the petite voirie, claims against the postal administration, compensation
for damages sustained by certain State employ~s on account of labor accidents, etc.
Formerly also when the distinction between so-called "acts of authority" or
"acts of gestion" was maintained, the judicial courts had jurisdiction over claims
for reparation growing out of acts of the former class.
' Compare to this effect Hauriou (Pricis de Droit Administratif et de Droit
Public [ioth ed. ig2] 871, note 2) who remarks that the judicial courts "push to
excess the prerogatives of the administration" (see the examples cited by him)
and Duguit, (Les Transformations du Droit Public [19131 i69) who says the
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JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDINANCES
A study of the history of French administrative law during the last
hundred years will show that its development has consisted principally
in the working out of remedies for the protection of private individuals
against the arbitrary and illegal conduct of the administrative authori-
ties and in the extension of the control of the administrative courts
(particularly the council of state) over the acts of these latter authori-
ties. It may be remarked, however, at the outset that the judicial
courts also exercise a limited control over administrative conduct. This
control is known as l'exception d'ilh~galiti, by means of which the
inferior judicial courts refuse to impose fines for the violation of illegal
administrative ordinances. 1 2  It is somewhat analogous to the power of
American courts to refuse to enforce unconstitutional acts of the legisla-
ture. This control has gone through a very interesting process of
development. During the early years of the First Empire when the
judicial courts were, in large measure, the servile instruments of
Napoleon, they refused to entertain the plea of illegality as a bar to
prosecution for the violation of all acts of the administrative authorities,
from the lowest to the highest. In 18io, however, the court of cassa-
tion which three years before had held that the inferior judges had no
right to refuse to enforce prefectoral or municipal police ordinances on
the ground of their illegality, changed its opinion and ruled that they
were not bound to impose fines for the violation of such ordinances.
During the period of the Restoration when the judges became more
independent in consequence of the adoption of the rule of irremova-
bility, they went further and held that they were not even bound to
impose fines for the violation of ordinances issued by the King,'
8 excep-
judicial courts, even the highest, still show a sort of superstitious fear of the
administration; that they are inclined to regard an administrative act as a chose
sacrge, that suitors have little confidence in them when the issue involves adminis-
trative questions, and that they look to the council of state rather than the court of
cassation as the better protector of the rights of the individual against the arbi-
trariness of the administration. Compare also Duquesnel, Jurispr udence Comparie
du Conseil d'Etat et de la Cour de Cassction (1912) 152-3 and Couzinet, Etude
sur la Respowsabiliti des Groupem-ents Adrministratifs (I91) 277, both of whom
point out that the judicial courts more frequently sustain the claims of the admin-
istration, whereas the council of state pronounces more often in favor of the
victims of administrative misconduct. American writers who are familiar with
the jurisprudence of the two Supreme Courts also admit that the rights of the
individual are better protected by the council of state than by the court of cassa-
tion. Compare Parker, The Law of the Constitution (199o) 3 AmER. POL. Scr.
REv. 363 and 2 Goodnow, op. cit. 231.
'Appeal lies from the decision of the inferior judge in such cases to the court
of cassation, for he too may commit excess of power by declaring an illegal ordi-
nance to be legal and by condemning the violator of it. Compare Cartault, De
L'Excs de Pouvoir a la Cour de Cassation (1911) 56.
1' Their decisions were sustained by the court of cassation.
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tion being made only of those which were required to be submitted by
the Crown to the council of state for its advice (so called r~glements
d'administration publique). Over this latter class of ordinances neither
the judicial nor the administrative courts exercised any control through-
out the whole of the nineteenth century.
Prior to 1832 the competence of the judges in this matter was not
fixed by positive law but in that year section 15 of article 471 of the
penal code was revised and express provision was made for the punish-
ment by fine of persons found guilty of violating ordinances (r~gle-
ments) legally made. The addition of the last two words removed
whatever doubt that had formerly existed regarding the right of the
courts to refuse to impose fines for the violation of illegal ordinances
and consequently to decide whether they were legal or illegal. The
definite acceptance of this form of judicial control over the administra-
tive authorities constituted an exception to the principle laid down by
the legislation of the Revolutionary period (notably the law of 1790)
and subsequently embodied in the penal code (Act 127), that the judges
should not interfere with the conduct of the administrative authorities.
As the rule is now interpreted, the judicial courts may pass upon the
legality of nearly every administrative act for the violation of which a
fine is prescribed, and illegality includes not merely nonconformity to
the laws but also incompetence, vice of form, violation of the principle
of equality of citizens, of personal liberty, liberty of conscience, inviola-
bility of domicile, violation of property rights, etc. 14  Even so-called
ordinances of public administration issued by the President of the
Republic upon the advice of the council of state, which until 1907 could
not be questioned either before the administrative or judicial courts, are
now attackable before both classes of courts on the ground of illegality
and during the world war, when the French Parliament delegated
extraordinary ordinance power to the President, the judicial courts
regularly entertained the exception of illegality against such ordi-
nances.
1 5
This power of the judicial courts to declare illegal the ordinances of
the administrative authorities is, as Hauriou remarks, one of the "correc-
14 R6glade, L'Exception d'Illggaliti en France (1923) 40 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 393 if, hereafter cited as P, D. P. Whether mis-
application of power (d~tournemnent de pouvoir) on the part of the agent should be
considered as "illegality" there is a difference of opinion. R6glade (op. cit. 415)
thinks it should be. N~zard (Le Contrble Juridictionnel [1919] 3 REv. GEN.
D'ADtmN. 4OO) holds the contrary opinion.
"S On the whole subject of the exception d'illigalit, see R6glade, op. cit.; Rives,
L'Exception d'Illgalitj (io8); I Garraud, Traiti de Droit Pinal (2d ed. 1913)
225 if; N~zard, Le Contrble Juridictionnel des R~glements d'Adinunistration
Publique (igog) 6 if; Cahen, La Loi et le R~glement (19o3) 369 if; Moreau,
Le Rfglentent Administratif (igo2) 261; Hauriou, Pricis de Droit Adininistratif
et de Droit Public (ioth ed. 1921) 67 if; Duquesnel, Jurisprudence Comparie du
Conseil d'Etat et de la Cour de Cassation (1912) 9 if, 137 if; and Cartault,
De l'Excbs de Pouvoir t la Cour de Cassation (1911) 57 if.
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tives" of the French administrative system which can not be ignored.
Formerly, it offered a means of control over administrative conduct
which was more frequently invoked than now, its importance having
decreased in consequence of the remarkable extension of the control of
the administrative courts, the effect of which has been to reduce corre-
spondingly the control of the judicial courts."
6 At best, however, it
never was an effective means of control, first, because it necessitated a
violation of the ordinance in order to bring the question of its legality
before the courts, and second, because the power of the judge was
limited merely to a refusal to impose the fine prescribed. He could not
annul the ordinance which he declared illegal; it remained in effect and
the administrative authorities might continue to enforce it against those
who were unwilling to violate it and submit to prosecution.
III
RECOURSE FOR EXCESS OF POWER
It remained for the council of state to develop a form of recourse by
which the administrative act could be attacked and declared null, by any
person who had an interest in having the law respected by the adminis-
trative authorities, and this without the necessity of having to violate
the ordinance and of submitting to prosecution. This remedy is known
as recourse for excess of power (recours pour exc4s de pouvoir).'7 It
is a distinctive creation of French administrative law"" and its pikce
essentielle.19 From the time of its creation in i8oo the council of state
16 Compare Riglade, op. cit. 420, 421.
' It thus happens that the administrative act is subject to a double control. It
may be attacked simultaneously before the judicial courts and the administrative
courts: before the former by means of the "exception of illegality"; before the
latter by recourse for excess of power. The council of state may uphold the
legality of the act while the judicial court may pronounce it illegal, the decision
of the council of state having no binding effect on the judge. On the other hand,
if the council of state annuls the act for excess of power its decision is binding on
the judicial court. The latter cannot therefore treat the act as legal and impose
fines for its violation. Not infrequently the judicial courts (which as stated above
are more favorable to the administration than are the administrative courts) uphold
the legality of administrative acts which the council of state pronounces null for
excess of power. See Dalloz, i9o9, I, 162, for such a case involving the legality
of the ordinance of a mayor relating to the ringing of church bells. For another
similar case see Dalloz, 1908, 3, 81. See also Idoux, La Jurisprudence du Conseil
d'Etat et de la Cour de Cassation Quant aux Points qui leur sont Communs (i908)
129 ff for a summary of the conflicting jurisprudence between the two supreme
courts relative to the revocation by mayors of permits to public utility companies
to use the streets. The former uniformly refused to annul such revocations
whereas the latter generally pronounced them illegal. See also Duquesnel,
op. cit. 69.
"Hauriou, op. cit. 422.
1 5Jze, Principes Gn.raux de Droit Adininistratif (1914) 89. On the whole
subject see du Clos,- Le Recours pour Excs de Pouvoir (19o6) ; Hauriou, op. cit.
420 if; 2 Laferri~re, Traiti de la Juridirtion Administrative (1887) 366-548;
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admitted recourse in annulment against ultra vires ordinances of prefects
and mayors but throughout the period of the Restoration and the greater
part of the July Monarchy it hesitated to allow recourse against ordi-
nances issued by the Crown.20  It justified its refusal on the theory
that the King was not an administrative agent but a political authority
and that his acts could no more be subjected to judicial control than
could those of Parliament. When in 1872 the council of state was reor-
ganized, given much of the character of a judicial court and a position
of greater independence as over against the Crown, express authority
was conferred upon it to annul for excess of power the acts of the
administrative authorities. Thus the theory of recourse for excess of
Rower which had formerly rested entirely upon the jurisprudence of the
council of state was now sanctioned by positive legislation of Parlia-
ment. This date marks a new starting point in the evolution of a
remarkable body of case law dealing with remedies against ultra vires
acts of the administrative authorities. Henceforth the council of state
showed less timidity in admitting recourse against the acts of the Chief
of State. It began at once to enlarge the category of authorities whose
acts it was willing to annul, the category of acts which it permitted to be
attacked, and the grounds upon which it allowed recourse.
Regarding the acts of the President of the Republic it still declined
however to permit his so-called ordinances of public administration (les
r~glements d'administration publique) to be attacked on the ground of
excess of power2 - though other ordinances issued by him were attack-
able equally with those of inferior administrative agents. The view of
the council of state was that this class of ordinances being issued by the
President in pursuance of authority delegated to him by the Parliament
they were a species of "dqlegated legislation" assimilable to acts of
Parliament and not therefore subject to judicial control.2 Moreover,
Duguit, Les Transformations du Droit Public (1913) ch. 6; also his Droit Consti-
tutlonnel (1889) (see index) ; Berth4lemy, Traiti de Droit Administratif (9th ed.
192o) 1O42 if; Thze, op. cit. supra (see index) ; Dareste, Les Voies de Recourse
Contre les Actes de [a Puissance Publique (1914) ; Appleton, Les Progras Ricents
du Recours pour Exc~s de Pouvoir (1917) ; Jacquelin, Les Principes Dominants
du Contentieax Administratif (1899) 227 ff.
' J~ze, op. Cit. 217. Vivien at ihe time complained that the council of state
would not allow recourse against acts of the Chief of State. Etudes Administra-
tives (1859) 313.
t These are ordinances issued by the President for supplementing or executing
acts of parliament. They are issued in pursuance of authority conferred by
Parliament and must be laid before the council of state for its advice-which
advice, however, the President is not bound to take. As to the several types of
Presidential ordinances see 2 Laferri~re, op. cit. 9 if; Berth~lemy, op. Cit. 112 if;
Moreau, Le R~glement Administratif (1902) 145 and 2 Duguit, Droit Constitu-
tionnel (19ii) 451 ff.
"Whether such ordinances are really the result of legislative delegation as the
council of state claims, has been the subject of much discussion and of controversy
among French jurists. The theory of the council of state was supported by most
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having been submitted to the council of state for its advice in advance
of their promulgation it could not consistently admit recourse for the
purpose of having them annulled. 23  But as time passed the attitude of
the council of state came to be more and more criticized as illogical and
indefensible and before the close of the nineteenth century it began to
show signs of a tendency to admit a breach in the ancient principle.
Thus it asserted the right to determine whether such ordinances were
regular in form, that is, whether they had been submitted in advance
by the President to the deliberation of the council of state in general
assembly for its advice. Then it went a step further and asserted the
right to determine whether they were materially regular (au fond), that
is, whether the ordinance was within the legal competence of the Presi-
dent,24 and finally, whether it was in accord with the general principle
of the law for the execution of which it had been issued. In the mean-
time, also, the council of state had begun to allow recourse against indi-
vidual acts in execution of ordinances of public administration .
2  This
jurisprudence, which admitted specific acts against such ordinances to
be attacked for excess of power but which denied recourse against the
ordinances themselves, was criticized as wholly illogica2 ' and this the
council of state finally recognized in a famous decision rendered in
I9O7. Some years before, the President of the Republic had issued
an ordinance of public administration in pursuance of authority dele-
gated by an act of Parliament in 1842, the effect of which, certain rail-
road companies contended, was to violate their contracts with the State
and to deprive them of their rights under the law. They accordingly
attacked the ordinance on the ground of excess of power, as being
of the early writers on French administrative law, such as Aucoc, Laferrire,
DeCrocq, Batbie, St. Girons and others. The great majority of present day
writers, however, reject the theory and hold that legislative power cannot be
delegated. Such are the opinions of Esmein, De la Dfligation du Pouvoir Ligis-
latif (1894) I R-v. Poi. Er PAR.L. 2o9, and his Droit Constitutionnel (4th ed. i9o6)
580 if; Berth~lemy, op. cit. 122; also his article; Le Pouvoir Rkglenwntaire du
Prisident (I898) I5 REv. POL. zr PARL. 5, 322; Jze, op. cit. 222; also his note
in 25 R. D. P. 45; Nizard, op. ct. 33; Hauriou, op. cit. i5o; Appleton, op. cit.
io, and Duquesnel, op. cit. 14I. Among contemporary writers who defend the
theory of legislative delegation may be mentioned Moreau, Le Raglement Adminis-
tratif (19o2) 18o; Cahen, La Loi et le Raglenent (19o3) 232 if; and Teissier,
Responsabiliti de la Puissance Publique (ixo6) g.
"It may be remarked in this connection, however, that it is to the council oi
state in general assembly that ordinances are submitted for its advice and not to
that part of the council which exercises contentious jurisdiction. The body which
hears actions for annulment on account of excess of power is not therefore the
same body which gives its advice to the President.
" Jze, 23 R. D. P. 72 and 25 ibid. 42 ff.
Duquesnel, op. cit. 138.
Compare N~zard, op. Cit. 21 and the opinions there cited and Duquesnel, op. cit.
139 and the opinions cited by him.
"Campagnies du Nord, d'Orleans, du Midi, de l'Est et de l'Ouest, December 6,
1907.
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beyond the legal competence of the President. The minister of public
works appeared for the government and argued that it was a long
established principle of French jurisprudence that ordinances of public
administration issued by the President could not be made the object of
recourse for excess of power. The council of state, however, abandoned
the century-old rule, took jurisdiction of the case and annulled the presi-
dential ordinance. It declined, however, to abandon the theory of legis-
lative delegation upon which it had always based its refusal to admit
recourse against such ordinances. To this theory it still clings, though
it no longer considers it as a sufficient reason for treating presidential
ordinances as immune from attack and annulment when they are ultra
vires.2
8
The decision was a landmark in a long and remarkable evolution of
the jurisprudence of the council of state and it has been frequently
affirmed since 1907.29 It afforded a striking illustration of the indepen-
dence of the council of state as over against-the government and is a
sufficient answer to the assertion of critics that its decisions are usually
in conformity with the wishes of the government. In this case the
government was deeply interested in obtaining a decision upholding
the validity of the ordinance and it made every effort to induce the
council of state to stand by its former decisions and refuse the recourse
demanded, but without success.
The full effect of the decision can only be appreciated when we
remember that it is the practice of the French Parliament-one which
has been greatly extended in recent years-to, formulate its acts in very
general terms and to delegate to the President the power of issuing ordi-
nances not only to regulate the details of their execution but often to
supplement in important respects their provisions."0 These ordinances
though not in form statutes are yet intrinsically a species of supple-
The probable reason why the Council of State refuses to abandon the theory
of delegated legislation is that if it were not maintained it would be difficult to
defend the constitutionality of the action of Parliament in charging the President
with issuing ordinances of a legislative character. J~ze (25 R. D. P. 45) criti-
cizes the refusal of the council of state to abandon its theory of legislative dele-
gation. When the President is charged with issuing ordinances there is, he says,
no "delegation" of the power of legislation, but simply an "invitation" to regu-
late certain subsidiary matters which could not well be dealt with in the statute.
The decision on the merits of the issue was therefore right, he says, but it was
wrong in so far as it was based on the theory of delegated legislation. To the
same effect see 2 Duguit, Droit Constitutionitel (1911) 464, who points out that
the reasoning of the council of state was contradictory because if there was legis-
lative delegation the President would no longer be an administrative authority and
hence recourse against his ordinances would not be allowable.
" See the cases cited by Jaze, Principes Ghnraux, 22. note 2. The importance
of the case is discussed by J~ze in 25 R. D. P. 5, if; by NMzard, op. cit. 22 if, and
by Duquesnel, op. cit. I42 ff.
" See the examples mentioned by 2 Duguit, Droit Constitutionnel (igxi) sec. 161,
and by N~zard, op. cit. 23 ff.
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mentary executive legislation which frequently impose obligations on
the citizens and affect their rights of person and property. 3' In conse-
quence of the decision of 1907 the legality of all such ordinances is
subject to review by the council of state and when they are found to be
ultra vires they are annulled with the same freedom with which the acts
of inferior administrative authorities are annulled. The effect has been
to enlarge immensely the domain of judicial protection against the arbi-
trary and illegal acts of the government.
IV
THE DOCTRINE OF ACTES DE GOUVERNEMENT
There still remain, however, two categories of presidential acts against
which the council of state refuses to admit recourse for excess of power.
The first of these are the decrees or decree-laws, as they are sometimes
called, issued by the President in pursuance of authority conferred by
the Senatus-Consultum of 1854 for the regulation of affairs in the colo-
nies.3 2 Now the power of the council of state to annul is expressly
restricted by the law of 1872 to acts of the "administrative authorities"
and it has been the view of the council of state all along that when the
President issues a colonial decree he acts not as an "administrative" but
as a "political" authority. s Such decrees therefore are not attackable
for excess of power. But it may now be said that whatever force this
distinction may have formerly had, it has had little or none since 1907
when the council of state abandoned the distinction between simple
ordinances and ordinances of public administration and extended the
doctrine of recourse for excess of power to the latter. Logic and con-
sistency therefore would require the council of state to abandon the dis-
tinction between the President as an administrative agent and the
President as a political authority and admit recourse for excess of power
against the acts performed by him in both capacities without distinc-
tion.
34
The second category of presidential acts against which the council of
state refuses to admit recourse for excess of power are the so-called
"acts of government" (actes de gouvernement). The distinction
between acts of this character and other acts of the President has long
been an established principle of the jurisprudence of the council of
state and it too rests, in the main, on the distinction which the French
make between the President as an administrative agent and as a political
authority-between the function of "administering" and the function
' Compare I Duguit, op. cit. supra note 30, at p. 195.
' This Senatus-Consultim has lost its -constitutional character but still retains
its force as a statute.
' Compare Tessier, op. cit. i8.
"Compare J~ze, Principes Gin&auX:, 216; N~zard, op. cit. 58; Tessier, op. cit.
i8; and Duquesnel, op. cit. 144.
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of "governing." The conception of "actes de gouzernement" has
played an important r6le in French administrative law and it has been
the subject of much controversy among French jurists and text
writers.3 -5 The difference of opinion has related not so much to the
general principle as to where the line of demarcation between such acts
and simple administrative acts should be drawn.38 Some of the older
writers construed the category of government acts so broadly as to
bring within its scope nearly every measure which in the judgment of
the government was a public necessity or which even subserved an
important public interest.37 Such acts might violate private rights but
it was the theory that if they were necessary to the social or national
defense the government might resort to them, in which case it was
responsible only to Parliament and not to the council of state. There
is still no agreement as to what acts fall legitimately within this cate-
gory although the tendency of opinion and of the jurisprudence has
been to reduce the number to very narrow limits. The jurisprudence of
the council of state and the tribunal of conflicts has undergone a
remarkable change in regard to such acts. During the Second
Empire they interpreted the doctrine very broadly and refused to allow
recourse against a great variety of acts such as the suppression of
newspapers, decrees forbidding the distillation of grains, the confisca-
tion of the lands of the children of Louis Philippe, the seizure of certain
" See 4 Dufour, Droit Administratif (187o) 6oo if; 2 DuCrocq, Drolt Adminis-
tratif (7th ed. 1897) 20 if; 7 Batbie, Droit Administratif (2d ed. 1885) secs. 389
if; 2 Laferri~re, op. cit. ch. 2; I Aucoc, Confirences sur le Droit Administratif
(1882) sec. 289; Jacquelin, op. cit. 297 if; Berth6lemy, op. cit. 15 if; J~ze,
op. cit. supra note 34, at pp. 229 if; Hauriou, op. dt. '431 if; Duguit, Transforina-
tlions, 194 if; Baunigart, Les Garanties Juridictionnelles du Droit Public Moderne
(914) 127 if; Courtois, Thiorie des Actes de Gouverneinent (i8g), where a full
bibliography may be found; Tessier, op. cit. 41 ff and 124 if- Br~mond, Des Actes
de Gonvermenent (1888) 5 R. D. P. 23 if; and Michoud, Des Actes de Gouverne-
ment in i Annales de l'Enseignment Supgrieur de Grenoble (1889) 263 ff.
" Many distinguished French jurists, however, condemn the theory in toto as
being arbitrary and contrary to the spirit of modern French law. There are not,
or should not be, they maintain, any "acts of government." Such is the view of
Berth~lemy, op. cit. 121; J~ze, op. cit. 232; Brimond, art. cited at p. 23; and
Michoud, art. cited at p. 82. Certain writers who believe the theory is useful
and should be retained would avoid the full consequences by allowing the courts
to refuse to apply such acts when they are illegal, without allowing them to be
annulled. Others would allow individual measures in execution of such acts, but
not the acts themselves, to be attacked, and as regards measures in execution of a
state of siege, the council of state has adopted this solution. But as Br6mond
(art. cited at p. 64) pertinently asks, of what advantage is it to the government
to have its decrees exempted from judicial attack if the specific acts of its agents
in execution of them may be attacked and annulled?
" Among such acts were measures of protection against riots, insurrection, floods,
epidemics and even measures of sanitary police. The suppression of certain news-
papers and measures against the members of dethroned dynasties were also
included in this category.
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manuscripts of the Duc d'Aumale, etc.
38 'But after 1872 when the
reorganized council of state acquired a larger degree of independence,
it adopted a different attitude and did not hesitate to allow recourse
against many so-called actes de gouvernement which were no different
in principle from those with which the old council of state had declined
to'interfere3 9 By a series of decisions it has steadily reduced the
hitherto large domain of governmental acts which escaped the control
of the council of state until today it includes little more than such acts
of the President as the calling of elections; summoning, adjourning and
closing of parliament; the conduct of foreign relations ;40 measures in
connection with the maintenance of a state of siege and certain extraor-
dinary measures in time of war in the interest of the national 
defense.4 1
Of these the last three alone are of any importance. As the jurispru-
dence now stands the theory of acts of government presents little danger
to the citizens for there are few administrative acts left the legality of
which is not open to attack before the council of state.
4 2  The acts of
the President, once regarded as those of a representative of the national
sovereignty, have gradually ceased to be such and are now treated, with
a very few exceptions, as those simply of an administrative agent.
This long-hoped for situation is due to the impartiality and indepen-
dence of France's two great administrative courts, the council of state
and the tribunal of conflicts.
43
' Some of these cases are discussed in my article, Judicial Control of Adminis-
trative and Legislative Acts in France (1915) 9 AmER. POL. Sci. RE'v. 656. See
also Br~mond, art. cited note 35, at pp. 63, 64; 2 Laferri&re, op. cit. 37-38;
Hauriou, op. cit. 434 and Duguit, The French Administrative Courts (914) 29
POL. ScI. QUART. 385, 395.
' See JRze, (903) 3 REv. G~N. D'ADmIN. 392 if; 2 Laferri&re, op. cit.
39; Michoud, art. cited note 35, at pp. 16-,7; and Duguit, art. cited note 38, at p.
396 and his Transformations, 199.
' There are even indications of a disposition to admit recourse against illegal
acts of diplomatic and consular representatives. Thus the council of state has
recently held that it was competent to award damages against a minister for
refusing to marry two French citizens. J~ze criticizes the refusal of the council
of state to allow recourse against the acts of diplomatic agents and predicts that
in the near future its attitude will be abandoned. He thinks also that the acts of
the administration in execution of treaties and conventions will likewise be brought
under the control of the council of state. 21 R. D. P. 78 ff.
'During the World War the council of state refused to allow.recourse against
decrees of the President inspired by raison d'Etat. R~glade, L'Exception d'Illege-
liti (1923) 40 R. D. P. 405.
' Compare J~ze, op. cit. supra note 34, at p. 234 and Riglade, art. cited at p. 405,
who remarks that the theory of acts of government as formerly maintained has
been completely abandoned by the council of state and the tribunal of conflicts.
' Duguit, Tranformations, 194, 200.
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V
GROUNDS OF ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
The council of state and the tribunal of conflicts have by their deci-
sions not only extended the list of administrative agents whose acts may
be annulled for excess of power and enlarged the category of such acts,
but they have also greatly extended the grounds upon which they may be
annulled. Originally these grounds were: incompetence, irregularity
(vice de forme) and violation of the letter of the law. For a long time
both tribunals proceeded on the theory that administrative acts were,
in the main, discretionary in character and so long as they were within
the technical competence of the authority performing them they were
not permitted to be attacked for excess of power, even though they
were contrary to the spirit of the law and were done for another purpose
than that contemplated by the law. The council of state always refused
to inquire into the motive which inspired the agent or the real object
sought to be accomplished by the act. After 1872, however, it began to
take a different view and in time there was developed the doctrine of
"misapplication of power" (ditournement de pouvoir) according to
which it will annul an administrative act which, though within the legal
competence of the agent, is in reality done for another purpose than that
which the law authorizing it had in mind. Thus a municipal council is
dissolved by a prefect ostensibly because of irregularities in the election
but in reality because it is politically opposed to the prefect; a minister
of war excludes a grain dealer from bidding for a government contract
because his political opinions are opposed to those of the government;
a mayor revokes a permit, refuses permission to a hackman to park his
carriage at the railway station, forbids the ringing of church bells
during certain hours, orders the closing of certain establishments-in
all these cases for other reasons than those intended by the law." It is
still a rule of the council of state, however, that it will not presume that
an administrative agent intends to use his power for another purpose
than that authorized by the law45 and as late as 1903 it denied that it was
within its competence to inquire into the motives which animated officials
in exercising their powers. But in 1914 it appears to have definitely
"For these and other cases among many see Hauriou, op. cit. 457-8; 2 Laferri re,
op. cit. 453 f; J~ze, 23 R. D. P. 265 if, and 25 ibid. 682; Duguit, L'Acte adminis-
tratif et L'Acte Juridictionnel (19o6) 23 R. D. P. 413-471. Even the refusal
of a minister to appoint a candidate to office who is entitled to the appointment,
where the real motive is to abolish the office, and the exclusion of a candidate from
an examination when the actual reason is foreign to the interest of the public
service, have been held to be ditournerwnt de pouvoir. The council of state even
annuls the refusal of municipal councils to appropriate the sums of money which
are obligatory upon them in execution of certain laws enacted by Parliament.
Their persistent refusal to make such appropriation has led to numerous conflicts
between the government and the municipalities. See Baumgart, op. cit. 123.
'J ze, 40 R. D. P. 521.
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abandoned this view and in a case involving the validity of a municipal
ordinance for the "pretended" reorganization of a certain municipality
it annulled the ordinance on the ground that the reason alleged was
false, the real motive being to get rid of certain municipal employ6s
because of their political hostility.46
The result of this extension of the doctrine of misapplication of
power has been to reduce very greatly the discretion of the administra-
tive authorities and to bring under the control of the council of state a
large realm of administrative action which formerly escaped its watchful
eye. Formerly mayors and prefects under the pretext of protecting the
public health or safety frequently issued ordinances the real purpose of
which was the financial interest of the local government, some railroad
company or even the political interests of the government. Today
their real motives in all such cases are subjected to the searching
scrutiny of the council of state.
VI
PERSONS QUALIFIED TO ATTACK THE LEGALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
No less interesting has been the development of a new jurisprudence
by which the doors of the council of state have been opened wider and
wider to private individuals who may wish to attack the acts of the
administrative authorities. For a long time no one who was unable to
show that the act complained of violated a legal right of his was per-
mitted to knock at its doors. Later the council of state began to admit
the existence of mere interest-on the part of the plaintiff as a sufficient
ground of attack. But in the beginning it insisted that this interest
must be direct and personal, pecuniary or material; mere impersonal
interest such as any good citizen might have in the observance of the law
was not sufficient. Gradually, however, the council of state began to
admit one relaxation after another from the rigor of the early rule until
today the plaintiff is merely required to show that he has a simple inter-
est in the annulment of the act-an interest which may be only moral
rather than material and which may not be detachable from the common
interests of all citizens or from those of an association of which he may
be a member.47 Thus any member of an association of functionaries has
sufficient interest to attack an appointment, a promotion or a dismissal
made in violation of ministerial civil service regulations. 8 So has any
"Appleton, Les Progr~s Ricents du Recours pour Excs dit Pouvoir (1917) 37.
See other cases cited by Baumgart, op. cit. 121 where the council of state considered
the motives of administrative authorities in order to determine whether they were
guilty of ditourinent de pouvoir. Compare also Duguit, Transforn wionw,
207 ff.
', But it is not to satisfy the interest of the plaintiff that recourse is allowed.
His interest is only the justification. The real interest is to assure observance of
the law. Berth6lemy, op. cit. 1O45.
" It may be remarked in this connection that the council of state does not hesi-
tate to annul the acts of ministers, prefects and mayors done in violation of their
own ordinances. They are free at any time to abrogate or modify their ordinances,
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member of a university faculty who wishes to attack the legality of a
decision made by the faculty for the awarding of a prize, contrary to its
own regulations. Similarly, the council of state has held that an inn-
keeper whose house fronts on a public square has sufficient interest to
attack the order of a mayor forbidding the holding of a market on the
square, although the order violates no legal right of his. Recently the
council of state has gone to the length of annulling appropriations made
by municipal councils when they are not within its legal competence4
8 as
well as ordinances relating to the management or disposal of the muni-
cipal patrimony or which involve the imposition of financial charges
upon the municipality, when they are not authorized by law. Likewise
any voter has sufficient interest to attack and have annulled a municipal
ordinance dividing an election district in violation of the law.
50
As a result of these "new conquests" the doors of the council of state
today are open to nearly every citizen who may wish to attack as ultra
vires any act of an administrative authority from the President down to
the mayor, including also the acts of municipal councils.
51
VII
THE DOCTRINE OF PARALLEL RECOURSE AND THE COUNCIL OF STATE AS
JUDGES OF FACTS
Recourse to the council of state for the purpose of annulment on the
ground of excess of power has, however, always been regarded as an
extraordinary remedy and it is not open to the individual whenever
there is a parallel remedy by pursuing which he can obtain satisfaction.
but so long as they remain in force the council of state insists that they shall be
respected. It thus happens that while Parliament has refused to pass a civil
service law for the protection of functionaries the council of state has come to
their rescue and protects them against the arbitrary conduct of their superiors.
See the cases cited by Jze, 23 P. D. P. 483 ff. The council of state will equally
annul the verbal act of a mayor dismissing a municipal employ6 in violation of
the regulations.
' The council of state reached this important conclusion only in igoi in the
now famous Casanova case where it affirmed that any taxpayer had sufficient
interest to enable him to attack an unauthorized appropriation of a municipal
council. The decision was reaffirmed in the Petit case in 19o5, in the case of
Camtut and others in i9o6 and in the case of Pressensi et Morhardt in 1911. For
a long time the council of state had refused to permit taxpayers generally to attack
the ordinances of municipal councils on the ground of excess of power. See the
cases cited by Appleton, op. cit. ig. For a long time also it refused to allow
recourse against administrative acts which were in the form of contracts. But
recently it has abandoned this view. See thd cases cited by J]ze in 23 R. D. P.
264.
'As to these and other cases see Baumgart, op. cit. 65 ff.
"As to the development of this jurisprudence see especially J~ze, Principes
Gin-raux (index) ; also his article in 23 R. D. P. 254 if; Hauriou, op. cit. 437 if;
Duguit, Transformations, ch. 6; Appleton, brochure cited note 46, at pp. 18 ff;
Baumgart, op. cit. 64 if; Baudouin, Notion de L'Intgr&t dan le Recours pour
Excbs de Pouvoir (1904) and Le Fur, (I911) I REv. GfN. D'ADmIN. 12 if, 129 ff.
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This is the theory of "parallel recourse" which was developed by the
council of state mainly for the purpose of safeguarding against
encroachment the jurisdiction of the judicial courts as well as that of the
other administrative courts,52 for it is well to remember that the council
of state is not the only tribunal which may annul an administrative act,
nor is it the only one which may pass on the question of the legality of
such acts. It is out of respect for the jurisdiction of these other courts
that the council of state insists that whenever the individual can obtain
relief by recourse to them he must knock at their doors rather than at its.
Furthermore, if he may obtain satisfaction from the council of state by
another proceeding than recourse in annulment for excess of power he
must follow that procedure. In this, as in other respects, however, the
council of state has shown in recent years a disposition to admit relaxa-
tions from the rigor of the old rule, so that the doctrine of parallel
recourse has been greatly undermined if it has not been abandoned.
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Suitors have found, however, that the remedy of recourse in annul-
ment before the council of state for excess of power is usually more
effective than the so-called parallel remedies and whenever it is open to
them it is pursued. No other form of action offers the same advan-
tage.54 The remedy of exception d'il.galitM before the judicial courts,
for example, necessitates a violation of the administrative act in order
to attack its legality and if the court finds it to be illegal it cannot annul
the act. Likewise a taxpayer from whom an unauthorized tax has been
collected is still, exposed to the liability of being obliged to pay another
tax so long as the act under which it is collected has not been annulled.
And the same situation results from the holding of an election in
accordance with an apportionment made contrary to the law. In these
and like cases the only effective remedy is the annulment of the illegal
act and this only the council of state can do, and it can do so only by the
procedure of recourse for excess of power. The council of state,
always anxious to protect the people against arbitrary and illegal
conduct, could not have failed to be affected by these considerations, and
having already extended the notion of interest so as to enable almost
any citizen to invoke its protection, it could no longer close its doors to
those who could obtain only an ineffective remedy by means of a
parallel recourse either to it or another tribunal. It accordingly broke
with the old jurisprudence and now admits recourse for excess of
As to parallel recourse see 2 Laferri~re, op. cit. 444 ff; Baumgart, op. cit
77 if; Hauriou, op. cit. 444 if; Marie, L'Avenir du Recours pour Ezcs da
Pouvoir (1899) 16 R. D. P. 274 if; and Gavan, La Thiorie du Recours Parallble
Devant le Conseil d'Etat (1914).
Compare Baumgart, op. cit. 78 and Appleton, brochure cited note 46, at pp.
24-28 who goes to the length of saying that such is the jurisprudence of the
council of state to-day that one may regard as abrogated the rule that recourse
for excess of power is not allowable when there exists a parallel recourse.
" Gavan, op. cit. i8.
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power in many cases where it was formerly refused. 5 As has already
been remarked, the civil judges show much more hesitation if not
timidity in declaring administrative acts illegal than does the council of
state. In many cases the council of state has annulled acts which the
civil courts have sustained as legal.5 6
For a long time the council of state insisted that in actions for annul-
ment on the ground of excess of power it was a judge merely of the
law and not of the facts, and that it could not therefore inquire into
the expediency or utility of an administrative act. Theoretically the
council still holds this view, but in fact it is not strictly followed, if
indeed it is possible to do so. Thus where the administrative agent is
required, as he sometimes is, to mnotiver an ordinance which he issues,
the council of state does not hesitate to determine whether the reasons
given are in accordance with the facts.5 7  There are also many recent
decisions in which the council of state has certainly been influenced by
what it regarded as the inexpediency ('inopportunitg) of the act
attacked. This has been notably true in cases of municipal appropria-
tions alleged to be ultra vires, of ordinances of mayors relative to the
police des cultes (ringing of church bells, religious ceremonies, proces-
sions, etc.), of measures relative to public health and sanitation. dero-
gations by employers from the weekly rest law, etc. 58
VIII
EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
The competence of the council of state in a proceeding for annul-
ment on account of excess of power is limited to pronouncing the
nullity of the act. It cannot reform or modify it or substitute a new
one in its place. But unlike the decisions of a judicial court in the
proceeding known as exception d'ill~galit the effect operates erga
omnes; that is, not only the plaintiff but all other persons may benefit
from the decision. All acts which have been done in consequence of
the nullified ordinance are illegal and the injured plaintiff is entitled
to reparation.5 9 But the decision which pronounces the annulment
Compare Appleton, op. cit. 24-2g.
Gavan, op. cit. 18.
'T On the whole matter of the council of state as judges of facts see the notes
by JTze, in 24 R. D. P. 54; 28 ibid. 286 ff ; 39 ibid. 390 ff and 4o ibid. 43 ff. It
goes even farther, says Jze, and decides whether the agent has drawn from the
facts the legal consequences which follow. See also the recent cases cited by
(,halvon-Demersay, De I'Examen du Fait par le Conseil d'Etat statuant en
Matire de Recours pour Excs de Pouvoir (ig2) ; also Batumgart, op. cit. 91,
and the cases there cited.
' See the review by Baumgart, op. cit. 92-114.
'It may be remarked, however, that there are no means by which the adminis-
trative authorities may be compelled to give effect to a decision of the council of
state. Thus it may annul the decision of a prefect refusing to accord to an
employ the weekly day of rest to which he is entitled under the law, but it cannot
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cannot at the same time award the damages to which he is entitled. If
the injury was the result of the personal fault of the agent, a damage
suit may be brought against him in a judicial court; if the State is
responsible (that is, if the injury results from a fault of service) it is
necessary to bring another and a different action against it before the
council of state. This latter action is known as the recours ordinaire
contentieux, sometimes as the recours contentieux de la pleine juridic-
tion. Its purpose may be not only the recovery of damages but the
reduction of a tax, reimbursement of expenses, payment of a pension,
restitution of property, etc. Unlike a proceeding for annulment it asks
that something positive be done for the plaintiff and unlike it also, it is
directed not against the act but against the personne administrative
(the State, the department, or the commune). In order to bring it the
plaintiff must show that a right has been violated; the mere existence
of an interest is not sufficient.
Some French jurists criticize the distinction which is made between
the two forms of action and maintain that the council of state should
at the time it pronounces the annulment of the act, award damages to
the plaintiff if he is entitled to reparation.6" This would not only
economize the time of the council of state but it would relieve the plain-
tiff of the necessity of an additional action. In fact it is not always
clear which of the two recourses should be pursued. Thus the minister
of war refuses to bestow a medal to which a war veteran is entitled.
Is the remedy a proceeding for the annulment of the ministerial decision
or the ordinary contentious recourse to secure the medal? If the
former remedy is pursued and the decision annulled would the effect be
to give the claimant his medal?61 Formerly the council of state refused
to allow recourse for annulment when the effect of annulment would be
to condemn the administration to pay damages or make restitution; it
insisted that the proper remedy in such cases was the ordinary conten-
tious recourse.6 2  In proceedings for annulment it refuses to do more
than annul, and it hesitates to do even that when the effect would be to
accomplish an object for which the ordinary contentious jurisdiction
compel him to obey the decision. Likewise it may annul his refusal to insert in
the departmental budget an obligatory appropriation, but it has no means of
forcing him to do it. In a number of cases it has annulled the dismissal by mayors
of municipal employis, but by means of monthly suspensions, which the law allows,
mayors have avoided the effect of the decisions. See Duguit, Transforinations,
218-219. Similarly, the council of state may condemn the administration to pay
damages to an individual but it has no means of compelling it to conform to the
decision. See Baumgart, op. cit. 143.
'Compare J~ze, Principes Gn&aux, 96.
"i Such was the case of Uston de Villeriglan (22 R. D. P. 1O5). The council of
state annulled the decision of the minister but held that the annulment did not give
the claimant a right to the medal.
" See for the cases of Thiveneai (I9O7) and Desplogues (1911), note by J~ze,
29 R. D. P. 266.
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was intended.6 3 But lately it has shown a disposition to admit a relaxa-
tion from the rigor of the old rule. Thus in 1911 it allowed certain
functionaries who had been dismissed from their offices to join their
demands for the annulment of the acts of dismissal with their demands
for damages, thus consolidating the two actions." Again in the
following year (Lafage case) it allowed an action for annulment against
the decision of a minister refusing to a military surgeon an indemnity
for representation to which he was entitled under a presidential decree
and it annulled the decision although the effect was to give the surgeon
his indemnity.6 5 The case was exactly the same as those of Th6veneau
and Desplogues in 19o7 and 1911 respectively, where the council of
state had refused to allow an action for annulment because the effect
of annulment would have been to condemn the administration to pay
damages.
These relaxations from the former practice have created the belief
among certain jurists that ultimately the council of state will abandon
the old rule and that the distinction between the two proceedings will
tend to disappear.6 Professor Hauriou concludes from the recent
decisions that the new jurisprudence will doubtless become general and
that the recourse for annulment for excess of power will tendmore and
more to become absorbed by that of the ordinary contentious recourse
and.that out of the consolidation will develop an action for indemnity,
an incident of which will be a demand for the annulment of the act
causing the injury. In any case the importance of the proceeding of
ordinary contentious recourse seems certain to increase while that for
annulment will decline, although it will probably never entirely disap-
pear.6 T French jurists are not lacking who condemn the distinction
' Thus it annulled the dismissal of a functionary but told him that the recovery
of his arrears of salary could only be obtained by means of a separate action, the
ordinary contentious recourse. In another case it annulled the order of a prefect
authorizing the erection of a dangerous building but refused in the same proceed-
ing to order the destruction of the building. In still another case it annulled the
decision of a mayor establishing a property line but refused to condemn the
commune to reimburse him for the expense he had incurred in constructing a
building which had to be removed. In all these cases the remedy of the plaintiff
lay in an additional action, the ordinary contentious recourse.
"Cases of Blanc, Argaing, and Bisje, Sirey, 1912, III, 130. See also Baumgart,
op. cit. 43, note I.
"Jze, note in 29 R. D. P. 266.
"Such is the opinion of Professor Jze, 29 R. D. P. 266. He criticizes
Laferri~re for the reasons which he gives for maintaining the distinction between
the two proceedings and argues that the law of 1872 which fixes the jurisdiction of
the council of state never meant to say that it could -only annul in the proceedings
for excess of power. P. 284. But Professor Moreau, defending the jurispru-
dence of the council of state, remarks that if it can only annul in such a proceed-
ing it is because it is only asked to do this. As JTze points out, however, (ibid.
29) suitors in fact often ask it to do more. Compare also the remarks of x
Duguit, Droit Constitutionnel, 280.
"Pr~cis de Drolt Administratif (ed. 1921) 418.
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which the council of state maintains between recourse in annulment for
excess of power and the ordinary contentious recourse and who main-
tain that they should be consolidated, or that the latter should include
the former so that two separate actions would not be necessary to enable
the plaintiff to recover damages or obtain restitution of what properly
belongs to him.68
Ix
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE FOR ACTS OF ITS AGENTS
Guarantee of reparation for loss or damage which the individual
may have sustained on account of the torts of the state or its agents is
one of the features of French administrative law which distinguishes
it fundamentally from American and English law. In England and the
United States it is a general principle of law that the State is not liable
to private individuals for damages caused by the tortious acts of its
agents.69 In general the remedy of the individual in such cases is an
action for damages in a judicial court against the officer or agent
committing the wrong, for in these countries the principle that the agent
is personally liable and may be sued, is the general rule.
70 Originally
' Such is the opinion of M. JPze, 25 R. D. P. 671-69; of M. Marie, De l'avenir
du Recours pour Excs de pouvoir (1899) 16 R. D. P. 265 if, 476 if, and M.
Baumgart, up. cit. 41 ff.
' Compare Moore, Liability for Acts of Public Servants (1907) 23 L. QUART.
REv. 12 if; Maguire, State Liability for Tort (igi6) 3o HARV. L. REv. 20 if;
Dicey, Law of Constitution (2d ed. i88o) i8o if; Parker, State and Official
Liability (igo6) 1g HAmv. L. REv. 335 if; Duguit, Transformations, 177; Goodnow,
Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States (1903) 387 if; 2
Lowell, Government of England (908) 493; Nesmes-Des Marets, De la Respon-
sabilit Civile des Functionnaires (igio) 24 ff and Couzinet, La Responsabiliti
des Groupeinents Administratifs (igI) i5o ff and the English authorities cited
by him. The case of Bainbridge v. The Postnurter General [io6] I K. B. 178,
where the King's Bench division held that an individual who was injured by the
State owned and operated telegraph system could not recover damages from the
State or the telegraph administration, illustrates the English rule. The Crown,
said the court, was not liable for the torts of its agents; the remedy of the
individual, so far as there was any, was a personal damage suit against the agent
who committed the injury. The same general principle prevails in the United
States, though it may be remarked that the establishment of courts of claims,
the enactment of workingmen's compensation laws, and the passage of special
acts allowing the State to be sued in certain cases, indicate a tendency to abandon,
in part at least, the old rule of non-liability of the State for the misdoings of its
agents.
" See especially Lowell, Op. cit. 493; Goodnow, op. cit. 396 if-; Dicey, op. cit.
i8o if; Ashley, Local and Central Government, 3oo; and 2 Anson, Law and
Custmn of the Constitution (1897) 477. There are, of course, exceptions to the
general rule stated above. Thus in England the individual agent is not personally
liable on contracts made by him for public services, even when the contracts are
not authorized (Dunn v. Macdonald [1893] I Q. B. 401, 555) ; nor is he liable
for tort in an action brought against him in his official capacity. (Raleigh v.
Goschen [i898] I Ch. 73 ) See also the cases cited by Lowell, op. cit. 493, notes
3 and 4.
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the doctrine of the non-liability of the State was the rule in France but
it has long since been abandoned, at least so far as its responsibility for
the acts of administrative agents is concerned.7 1 The new principle of
State responsibility was the result, in part, ot the growth of the demo-
cratic conception that the State is a moral person possessing duties as
well as rights; and, in part, of the enormous expansion of the activities
of the State by which it came to be the largest employer of labor. As
such it ought to assume the same responsibility for indemnifying those
who sustain injuries on account of its faults or negligence as it compels
private employers of labor to do.7 2  In response to this change of senti-
ment there has been developed in France an elaborate body of juris-
prudence, mainly the work of the council of state and the tribunal of
conflicts, which definitely fixes the responsibility of the State and which
assures to the injured individual reparation, such as is entirely unknown
in Anglo-Saxon countries.78  The basic principle of this jurisprudence
is that the State is liable to the individual not only in contract but also
in tort where the tortious act of the agent is not a purely personal act;
that is, the state is liable where the injury is due to a fault of service
(faute de service). The fault may be due to an error, an omission, an
act of negligence or even of want of judgment on the part of the agent.
On the other hand, if the injury is done by the agent in his personal
and unofficial capacity, that is, if it results from a fa't personnel, he
and not the State is liable.
7 4
'In general the State is not responsible for the acts of judicial magistrates.
See Duguit, Transformations, 247-270 and Couzinet, op. cit. 76-83. But by an
extraordinary proceeding known as prise a partie, an action in damages may be
brought by the injured party against a judge or even the entire court for such acts
as fraud, extortion, arbitrary conduct, wilful denial of justice, etc. See Morizot-
Thibault, De la Responsabiliti des Magistrats, 11-m2, and my article on The
French Judiciary (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 349, 374. By a law of 1895
the French Parliament made provision for a system of State reparation for
persons wrongfully convicted of crimes. See my article, on Criminal Procedure
it France (1916) YALE LAW JOURNAL, 256, 282-283, and the cases there cited.
Regarding damages resulting from legislative acts the general rule is the irresponsi-
bility of the State but the tendency of the council of state is to admit more and
more the responsibility of the State for damages resulting from legislative acts
which violate contractual rights. See Couzinet, op. cit. especially pp. 68 and 74
and Duguit, Tran.sformations, 242-243.
Compare Walton, The French Administrative Courts and the Modern French
Law as to the Responsibility of the State for the Faults of its Officials (1918) 3
ILL. L. REv. 205-207. "The principle is," says M. Hauriou (op. cit. 363), "that
the administrative enterprise must be managed subject to the rights of third
parties." As to the evolution of the idea of State responsibility see Couzinet,
op. cit. ch. i.
Curiously enough there is no allusion in the Declaration of Rights, in any of
the constitutions or in any of the laws of France, to the responsibility of the State,
although there are numerous references to the responsibility of functionaries.
Compare Duguit, Transformations, 222-225.
"'This is the general principle, to which there are some exceptions. See Jaze,
Prncipes Gfniraux, 1o2.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
In the former case the remedy is a suit (le recours contentieux ordi-
naire) against the administration before the council of state; in the
latter case it is a personal damage suit in a judicial court against the
agent.
But prior to 187o an administrative agent could not be sued without
the consent of the council of state-a consent which was rarely given.
75
In the latter year the law was changed so as to permit such suits without
the consent of the council of state. The administration is always free,
however, to oppose the suit by "raising the conflict" if it thinks the act
complained of is not the personal act of the functionary, in which case,
it is for the tribunal of conflicts to decide the issue.
6 If it decides that
the act was a fait de service rather than a fait personnel the judicial
court is divested of jurisdiction and the suit must be discontinued."
In that event the remedy of the individual is a suit against the State
before the council of state. The competence of the council of state to
hear actions against the State for damages on account of the faults of
service of its agents was definitely affirmed by the tribunal of conflicts
in the famous Blanco case in 1872 which involved the liability of the
State for damages sustained by a child in the government tobacco
factory at Bordeaux. This decision opened the flood gates and from
then until now a steady stream of damage suits has poured in upon the
council of state.
Not long thereafter the question was presented as to whether the
local governments (departments and communes) and certain public
establishments were liable equally with the State for damages resulting
from faults of service committed by their agents and employ~s. After
"' See the statistics given by Jacquelin, op. cit. 128. It was always refused, says
Cot (La Responvabiitg Cizile des Functionnaires publics [1922] 58) when the
functionary merely executed the orders of his superior. But Berth~lemy, op. cit.
75, points out that the immunity of the agent from prosecution did not cover his
personal acts. As to the reasons for the rule see Hauriou, op. cit. 367;
Berthlemy, op. cit. 78-79 and Cot, op. cit. ch. 2.
"' But it is worthy of remark that only the administration can raise the conflict;
that is, it may prevent the judicial courts from encroaching upon the domain of
the administration, but the judicial courts cannot by raising the conflict prevent
the administration from encroaching upon their domain. See the criticism of
Jacqueyin, op. cit. 58.
SRJze thinks that this jurisprudence is contrary to the law of 187o which.
intended to remove all barriers to the prosecution of administrative functionaries.
(Op. cit. 1o2.) Jacquelin (op. cit. 132) holds the same opinion. But Cot (op. cit.
89-91) and Hauriou (op. cit. 369) defend the interpretation which has been
adopted. If the former view of the intent of the law of I87O had been adopted
the separation between "administration" and "justice," established at the time
of the Revolution, would have disappeared and the judicial courts would have been
left in full control of the administration. Now the tribunal of conflicts took the
view that the law of 187o never intended to impair the sacrosanct theory of the
separation of powers. Whatever may be the facts as to this, the rule was definitely
settled by the Pelletier case (1872) that the judicial courts are competent to hear
only cases involving the personal acts of functionaries.
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long hesitation the tribunal of conflicts in the Feutry case in i9o8
reached the conclusion that they were.
For a long time, however, the council of state, following the doctrine
of Laferri~re,78 made a distinction between so-called actes d'autoriti (or
actes de puissance publique), and actes de gestion. The former
embraced acts of command or prohibition and were considered to be
"emanations" of sovereignty. The latter were managerial acts such
as are involved in the operation of public utility services, the construc-
tion of public works, the operation of railroads, the postal service, tele-
graphs, telephones, etc.79 They are analogous to the acts of private
individuals in the administration of their patrimony or in the manage-
ment of business undertakings. Now it was felt that the State ought
not to be held liable in damages for injuries sustained in consequence
of acts of the former character, although it was admitted that such acts
might be annulled for excess of power. As to managerial acts, how-
ever, the council of state took a different view and decided that the
State might properly be held liable for damages resulting from faults
of service in the performance of such acts and it regularly entertained
jurisdiction of damage suits and condemned the State when faults of
service were proven. From the first, however, the distinction between
the two classes of acts was criticised by many jurists who maintained
that the State should be held liable in both cases. The distinction, it
was said, was vague, arbitrary and inconsistent with the established
French doctrine of the liability of the State for faults of service com-
mitted by its agents.80 The council of state, however, hesitated to
abandon its ancient doctrine and as late as 1899 in the Lepreux case it
affirmed the existence of the principle. But the criticism of Hauriou
and others was not without effect and in 1905 in the case of Tomaso
Greco and later in the Feutry case (19o8) it appears to have admitted
that the distinction was not well founded.8 ' In consequence, the
I op. cit. 7.
"Compare Berthlemy, op. cit. 43; Couzinet, op. cit. 36 and i Laferri~re,
op. ct. 436.
"Such was the view of Duguit, Transformations, I55, i66; Jize, Principes
Ginraux, 24; Hauriou, note on the Lepreux case of 1899 (Sirey, 1900, 3, I);
Baumgart, op. cit. 57-58; and Cot, op. cit. 235 ff. Baumgart (op. cit. 58, note I),
however, thinks that there are cases in which the irresponsibility of the State for
so called actes de puissance publique is justified.
"In the former case the government commissioner, M. Romieu, said the council
of state had come to recognize the "inconveniences, the contradictions and the
iniquitous consequences" of the distinction. Quoted by Duguit, Transformations,
259-26o. In the latter case the government commissioner, Tessier, declared that
the distinction had no legal basis, that it did not correspond to the realities and that
in truth there were no actes de puissance publique distinct from actes de gestion.
Berthilemy (op. cit. supra note x9 [9th ed. i92o] 44-46) appears to be one of the
few French jurists who uphold the former distinction although he admits that the
State may be held liable on grounds of equity.
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responsibility of the State for damages resulting from its faults of
service regardless of whether the acts causing them are acts of
"authority" or of "management," is now generally admitted.
X
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAULTS OF SERVICE AND PERSONAL FAULTS
The responsibility of the State is not yet, however, fully complete.
It is still a principle of French administrative jurisprudence that the
liability of the State, the department and the commune for damages,
extends only to those resulting from faults of service, and not to those
due to the personal faults of the functionary or agent. In the latter
case the functionary or agent is personally responsible and the remedy
of the plaintiff is a damage suit in a civil court against the official
causing the damage. This principle was definitely established by a deci-
sion of the tribunal of conflicts in 1872 in the Pelletier case.
82 Now the
distinction between acts of service and personal acts is by no means
clear.8 3 Laferri~re's doctrine 4 that the distinction is that between an
impersonal and a personal act is too vague for practical purposes.
Hauriou's theory 5 that a personal act is one which is detachable from
the official function has found more favor and it has been approved by
the tribunal of conflicts and the court of cassation. But cases are not
lacking in which this criterion was impracticable of application."
' The principle on which the distinction is based is that if functionaries were
personally liable for their faults of service they would show a timidity and hesita-
tion which would affect injuriously the functioning of the administration. On the
other hand, if they were absolutely irresponsible the public would be at their mercy.
The French solution represents a compromise by which they are held liable for
their personal faults while the State assumes responsibility for their official acts.
Compare Nesmes-Des Marets, op. cit. 50-52.
"It is hardly necessary to remark that not every act of service is a fault of
service nor every personal act a personal fault. In fact the two are frequently
confused.
1 op. cit. 648.
" Op. cit. 371.
'Thus the tribunal of conflicts has decided that the act of a mayor in ordering
the ringing of church bells on the occasion of a funeral was a personal act,
although it is difficult to see how the act was detachable from his official function.
See -the examples of personal acts mentioned by Hauriou, op. cit. 372, note I.
Nearly every French writer has suggested a criterion of his own. For Michoud's
theory, see his La Respoiwabiliti Morale (19o6) vol. I, sec. 64; for Cot's, see his
work cited supra note 75, part II, chs. 1-3; for Duguit's, see his Transformations.
273; for Berth~lemy's, see his op. cit. 75; for JTze's, see 26 R. D. P. 267 ff.
According to J&ze there is a personal fault when the act reveals a inauvaise volonti
and when the fault is a serious one (lourde) and it is serious when there is a gross
error of judgment as to the fault. The tribunal of conflicts has approved this
doctrine (case of Mascaras, 19o2) but there have been cases in which the agent
was held personally liable when the fault was not lourde and where there was no
inauvaise volont . The various theories of personal fault are examined by
Nesmes-Des Marets, De la Responsabiliti Civile des Functionnaires, 164 ff. See
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Clearly there are cases in which an element of personal fault may exist
in an act of service and there are also cases in which the two may coexist
and the damage may be due to both. 7 In such cases the injured indi-
vidual has two remedies :8 (i) he may bring a personal damage suit in
the civil courts against the agent; and (2) he may sue the State in an
administrative court, ordinarily the council of state. There is thus a
cotxistence of actions. Is there also a cumulation of liability? For a
long time the principle of cumulation of responsibility was not admitted.
The injured individual was allowed to sue the agent if he was personally
responsible or the State if it was responsible, but he could not sue both.
But this rule has been abandoned. There have been many cases in
recent years in which the judicial court found the agent guilty of a
personal fault and condemned him to pay damages while the council of
state found a fault of service in the same case and condemned the State
to pay damages. Here there was undoubtedly a cumulation of lia-
bility, that is, the establishment of the personal liability of the agent
did not exclude the liability of the State. Would there also be a cumula-
tion of indemnities so that the plaintiff might recover from both the
State and the agent more than the actual amount of his damages? A
famous case was that of Anguet (1911) where an individual, finding
himself in a postoffice after the public exit had been closed before the
hour fixed by the regulations, was set upon and beaten by two employ6s
of the postoffice while endeavoring to leave through a private exit.
There was a personal fault on the part of the employ6s who attacked
the plaintiff and they were condemned by the judicial court to pay
damages. But this did not prevent the council of state from condemn-
ing the State to pay damages for the fault of service involved in closing
the public exit in advance of the hour fixed by the regulations.89
also Soudat, Trait de la Responsabiliti (6th ed. i9II) sec. 1356 and Dupeyroux,
Faute personnwlle et Faute du Service punblic (1922).
Such were the cases of Anguet and LhuilUier described below.
It will be seen that the cumulation of liability results from the mutual indepen-
dence of the judicial and administrative courts and the existence of a disagreement
between them as to the nature of the fault. It is only when the judicial courts
find that the fault is personal and the council of state finds it is a fault of service
that there can be a cumulation of responsibility. This situation could only be
avoided by the establishment of a common supreme court over both the administra-
tive and judicial courts with the final power of decision as to the nature of the
fault.
' See also the similar cases of Beaudelet (I915) and of Lernonnier (1918) where
there was a cumulation of actions and of liability. In the latter case, which has
become famous, the mayor of a commune was condemned by the judicial court to
indemnify an individual who had sustained an injury through a personal fault of
the mayor in the management of a fete, while the commune was held responsible
by the council of state which attributed the injury to a fault of service. For a
good account of this case see J~ze's note, 36 R. D. P. 41 ff. See also the case of
Lhuillier (igig) where the State was held liable in damages for the purely personal
act of a drunken soldier who murdered a member of a family with whom he was
quartered. The council of state, however, maintained that there was a fault of
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But while admitting a cumulation of personal and State liability in
such cases the council of state took care not to admit the right of the
plaintiff to a greater indemnity than what was sufficient to cover his
damages. In the Babouet case it laid down the rule that the liability of
the State was limited to the payment of only that part of the indemnity
which by reason of his insolvency the agent was unable to pay; that is
the responsibility of the State was subsidiary. But in the Lemonnier
case the council of state adopted the principle of subrogation, that is, the
State was condemned to pay the total amount of damages awarded with
a reservation of its right to recover from the agent. 0 The view of the
council of state is that in the absence of some such rule the victim would
be unable to collect the damages awarded, as in cases where the agent
was insolvent.
XI
LIABILITY OF THE STATE FOR PERSONAL FAULTS OF ITS AGENTS
Some French jurists have interpreted the recent jurisprudence of the
council of state relative to the cumulation of personal and official liability
as marking a virtual abandonment of the theory of fault of service as
the basis of State liability for damages to private individuals and the
substitution of the principle of risk responsibility; that is, the abandon-
ment of the distinction between personal acts and acts of service and the
admission of the liability of the State for damages resulting from both
classes of acts without distinction. They maintain that the change
should be made because the distinction between the two classes of acts
is subtle and often impossible of application, 9' and that to compel the
injured individual to look to the agent for reparation in case the damage
resulted from the latter's personal fault would in many cases, as
service which consisted in the absence of proper surveillance. Likewise in a
series of cases involving damages caused by the construction of public works and
the non-performance of contracts the council of state has admitted the principle
of cumulation of responsibility. See Cot, op. cit. 293 ff and Fliniaux, art. cited at
pp. 345 ff. and the cases there cited.
"See I-auriou, op. cit. 380; Cot, op. cit. 298 if, and Fliniaux, art. cited at pp.
349 ff. Hauriou criticizes the rule of subrogation for the reason that the adminis-
tration may decline to compel the agent to make the reimbursement and hence the
principle of personal responsibility will tend to disappear. Cot (op. cit. 307) is
also of the opinion that the principle of cumulation of responsibility will have the
effect of greatly extending the responsibility of the State and of diminishing
correspondingly the personal liability of agents. Duguit thinks the council of
state exceeded its power in holding that the State has a right to recover from
the agent in such cases the amount of the indemnity paid by it. The jurisdiction
of the council, he says, is limited to deciding whether there was a fault of service
and whether therefore the State is liable to pay damages.
' See the criticism of Jacquelin, op. cit. 136. One French writer (Auger, Le
Tribunal des Conflits sous la Deuxime Ripublique [1911] 2oo) remarks that in
appearance the distinction is logical and even legitimate, but that in practice it is
purely arbitrary and sometimes leads to contradictory results.
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English and American experience proves, leave him without an effective
remedy. Professor J~ze in 19o9 predicted that in the near future the
council of state would adopt this view. He based his prediction on a
decision of the council of state made in February of that year in which
it affirmed the responsibility of the State for damages sustained by a
company through the personal fault of an administrative agent.2
When this decision was followed a few years later by others reaffirming
this principle Professor J~ze was able to say that his prediction had
come -true.9 3 In these cases the council of state, to be sure, based its
decision theoretically on the existence of a fault of service but in reality
it was the personal fault of the agent that had caused the damage."
Whatever may be the facts as to this controverted question all French
writers admit that the tendency of the jurisprudence of the council of
state and of the tribunal of conflicts in these last years has been in the
direction of admitting the liability of the State for all damages resulting
from the faults of its agents without distinction as to whether they are
personal faults or faults of service.9 5 Thus it has condemned the State
to indemnify an individual who was accidentally shot by a policeman
while pursuing an infuriated bull, although there was no fault of
227 R. D. P. 76-77. Case of La Compagnie Commerciale de Colonisation dit
Congo Frangais, Dalloz, 191O, 3, III.
See his notes in 31 R. D. P. 569 ff; 33 ibid. 378 if; 36 ibid. 4, ff.
t' Fliniaux, Le Cumul de la Responsabiliti de l'agent et de la Responsabilitg de la
personne nmrale administrative (1921) 38 R. D. P. 34o; Duguit, La Question de
la Coexistence des Responsabilitis (1923) 40 R. D. P. 26 f; Hauriou (op. cit.
380) ; Cot (op. Cit. 282, 287) and others, however, do not think that these decisions
justify J&ze's conclusions. Duguit maintains that there was in fact no cumulation
of responsibility but merely a parallelism of responsibilities and that the council of
state never held that the State was liable for the personal faults of its agents.
True the judicial courts held that there was personal fault, but the council of
state is not bound by the decisions of the judicial courts. Even if there existed
personal fault, it was not for it but for the fault of service which co~xisted with
it that the council of state held the State to be liable. There is not a single case,
Duguit maintains, in which the council of state ever condemned the State to pay
damages on account of the personal fault of an agent. On the contrary, there are
decisions in which the liability of the State in such cases was expressly denied.
M. Duguit's article contains a luminous and up-to-date discussion of the whole
question of coExistence of personal and official liability. See also the bibliography
on p. 40.
" Compare the conclusions of Fliniaux, 38 R. D. P. 356. It may be remarked in
this connection that the council of state has shown an increasing disposition to
construe strictly the notion of personal acts and whenever possible to attribute the
damage to an act of service. Thus in the beginning it considered such acts as the
delivery by a postman of a letter to a wrong address as a personal act, but in late
years it has treated them as faults of service for which the State was held liable.
See the cases cited by Hauriou, op. cit. 373. Note also the remarks of Duguit,
Transfornmations, 261, and his discussion of the Turpin case, p. 266. Recent deci-
sions have also revealed a tendency not to condemn agents for their personal
faults unless they were serious (lourde).
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service."" Likewise, following the close of the World War, the council
of state condemned the State to pay damages in a large number of cases
to individuals who had been injured by the explosion of shells that had
been collected by the public authorities in various places, although it
was impossible in many cases to impute any fault of service to the
State.9 7  It may be remarked that in exactly identical cases occurring
before the war the council of state had refused to condemn the State.98
The inevitable effect of the new jurisprudence must be to diminish
very greatly the personal responsibility of administrative agents.
Hauriou goes to the length of predicting that in a few years there will
be no prosecution of functionaries for their personal acts because the
State will be liable and the injured individual can obtain his reparation
more easily and certainly by suing the State.9 9 The effect of the pro-
gressive disappearance of the responsibility of functionaries upon their
character has not been overlooked by French writers.100 Fault as the
basis of the State's responsibility is finding an increasing number of
combatants who demand the substitution of the theory of risk responsi-
bility. Duguit, one of the most eminent of them, affirms that the State
cannot commit faults. It should be responsible for all damages
committed by its agents whether there is an alleged fault of service or
not.10 ' The acceptance of this doctrine, which now seems quite
probable, will, as Hauriou remarks, make the State an insurance society
against all damages resulting from its acts.10 2  Hauriou and others
have pointed out that the new doctrine, if accepted without qualification,
will entail a heavy responsibility for the State and will not be without
serious danger.
0 3
"Case of Tonoso Greco. See also the case of Phlichard (Igo9) where damages
were awarded an individual for being run over by a policeman although there was
no fault of service on his part.
"See the cases cited by Cot, op. cit. 238 if, especially that of Regnault-Desroziers
(1918).
" While the decisions in the post war explosion cases undoubtedly marked a
reversion of the jurisprudence of the council of state, some French writers do not
think it justifies the conclusion that the council of state has definitely abandoned
the distinction between personal faults and faults of service. Cot (op. cit. 242)
argues that the circumstances under which the new rule was applied in the recent
cases were entirely exceptional and that it has not in fact been followed since 192o.
" See his note in the Lemonnier case, cited above. Compare also Cot, op. cit. 315,
324.
10" Compare Cot, op. cit. 316, who remarks that an entirely irresponsible func-
tionary will be the worst possible functionary. To the same effect see also the
opinion of Jacquelin, op. cit. 124.
101 Transformations, 25o. But he does not favor the personal irresponsibility of
the agent. The State is not and cannot, he says, be responsible for the faults of
the agent when they are his personal acts entirely separable from the public
service. See his article cited, at p. 39.
*" See his note on the Regnault-Desroziers case, Sirey, x98-i9, at p. 26.





Such in outline are the dominant principles of the French droit
administratif in its present state of development. In the beginning, its
chief purpose was to protect the administration against interference on
the part of the judicial magistrates, but in the course of its development
it has become a system of law whose principal object is to protect
private individuals against the arbitrary and illegal conduct of the
administrative authorities and to insure reparation to those who have
suffered injuries on account of the faults of those authorities. The
degree of protection which it provides and the certainty of reparation
which it assures are distinctly greater than that which is afforded by the
law of any other country. It is to the council of state that this situation
is mainly due. For a long time the judicial courts were considered
to be the guardians of private rights, but this r6le has largely passed to
the council of state.10 4 With an expenditure of only 12 sous and
without the necessity of employing an attorney, almost any citizen can
now go to the council of state and secure the annulment of any illegal
act (with a few trifling exceptions) of any administrative authority,
whether it be that of the President of the Republic or a village mayor.
The congested dockets of the council and the thousands of cases which
it handles every year afford evidence enough of its popularity."0 5 The
number of cases submitted to it has grown rapidly. From 19o2 to 1913
the number increased from 3,113 to 4,273" 06 In recent years the flow
has reached such volume that the council is hopelessly in arrears with its
work'07 and the Parliament is confronted with the problem of how to
alleviate the situation.
0 8
1Compare Idoux, La Jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat et de la Cour de Cassation
Quant aux Points qui leur sout Communs (igo8) 1I, 44.
1"I have before me the calendar of the council for the 8th and 9th of March,
1912. It includes 37 cases, embracing actions for the annulment of many ordi-
nances of mayors, prefects, ministers and even of the President of the Republic;
of decisions of educational authorities; ordinances of the Residents-general and
governors of various colonies; the decisions of various councils of prefecture and
of departments; of commissions and councils of discipline; of the rector of the
University of Alger; etc.
10" See the statistics in 35 R. D. P. 5o9 ff.
1"" On the I5th of August, I917, there were 7,125 cases on its dockets. By the
15th of August, igig, however, the arrears had been reduced to 5,664. 37 R. D. P.
555. The work of the council was naturally increased during the war.
"m Various suggestions have been made with this end in view. The two most
important are: the creation of special regional administrative courts with final
jurisdiction save the right of recourse in cassation to the council of state, and the
transfer to the judicial courts of a portion of the content eux administratif.
Regarding the subject see two valuable articles entitled La Riforine de la Jurisdic-
tion Administrative, by Monsieur J. Laferri~re, in (1920) 37 R. D. P. 353 ff and
(1921) 38 ibid. 1O9 ff. See also Cot, op. cit. 3o6, who remarks that in consequence
of the crowded calendars of the council of state suitors can now get quicker action
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There are a few in France who criticize the whole system of adminis-
trative jurisdiction and maintain that it should be handed over to the
ordinary judicial courts as in England and the United States, 0 9 but the
existing system is approved and defended by the vast majority of
French writers and jurists and all attacks against it have so far proved
futile. There is little or no feeling in France that the system unduly
protects the official class, that by subjecting functionaries and private
individuals to a different law the latter are placed on a footing of
inequality, that the administrative courts are the servile instruments of
the government, and the like. The belief of English and American
critics that the members of the council of state, being removable at the
pleasure of the government, do not feel free to decide important cases
against it, has no real-basis. In fact, no member has ever been removed
or threatened with removal since the establishment of the third Republic,
nor is there any instance in which improper pressure was ever brought
by the government against any member to influence his decision."10
Public opinion today would not tolerate such interference and there is
no likelihood that it will ever again be resorted to. The hundreds of
decisions nullifying the acts of the government and condemning it to
pay damages for its wrongful acts is, in itself, a sufficient refutation of
the charge that the council of state lacks independence. Indeed, it has
been criticized by some Frenchmen for showing an excessive bias
against the government and in favor of private individuals; that it has
given more consideration to equity and less to law than should have
been done. It is in this respect that its jurisprudence differs essentially
from that of the court of cassation. If an American may venture to
criticize its jurisprudence he would say that it has been too progressive.
Whenever a long established rule has been found to stand in the way
of the protection and reparation which in the opinion of the council the
in the judicial courts. Generally, however, the remedy is an action before the
council of state and in any case suitors prefer the latter tribunal because it is well
known to be more favorable to private individuals than is the court of cassation.
"For example, Jacquelin, op. cit. io7 if, and Dareste cited by Couzinet, op. cit.
I91. M. Saget argued in the chamber of deputies on July 5, I92o that the system
of administrative jurisdiction should be abolished and the contentieux administratif
transferred to the judicial courts. "Justice rendered in the name of the French
people," he said, "should not have two faces; we wish it to be one and indepen-
dent. We think that the judicial courts alone, by reason of the irremovability of
the judges and their method of appointment, are capable of giving sufficient
guarantees to suitors, the guarantees to which they have a right." Quoted by J.
Laferri~re, 37 R. D. P. 553, note i.
z" Members of the council of state have assured me that there is absolutely no
foundation for the belief in England and America that the council is not entirely
independent of all government control or pressure. Dicey, the most redoubtable
critic of the French droit adininistratif, virtually admitted in the last edition of his
Law of the Constitution (7th ed. I9o8) that he had misunderstood it and that he
had relied too much upon de Tocqueville whose ignorance of the subject was well
known. See his preface to the seventh edition; also p. 327.
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individual was entitled to, it has not hesitated to reverse itself and
establish a new principle. But generally these revirements of jurispru-
dence have been in response to the teachings of the jurists and the
demands of public opinion.
As regards the responsibility of the State for damages done through
the faults of its agents the council of state has gone to extreme lengths.
The dominating principle of the new jurisprudence is that the liability
of the State should be the same as that of a private employer of labor,
that this liability should cover every injury resulting from a fault of
service and that the reparation due should be made by the State rather
than shifted to the personal shoulders of the agent. As stated above,
the recent decisions indicate that the council may soon go still further
and lay down the rule that the State shall be liable for injuries resulting
from any and every administrative act whether there is fault or not.
In short, the State shall assume the risk and become the virtual insurer
of its citizens against all damages resulting from its acts. The principle
of State liability has been carried to such lengths in recent years that the
responsibility of functionaries for their personal faults has been greatly
reduced and is tending more and more to disappear. But in general,
the new jurisprudence is approved by the French public, who believe
that considerations of justice require that the State should assume full
responsibility for all damages caused by its agents and indemnify the
victims thereof.
A remarkable feature of the French administrative law which has
thus brought under the control of the council of state the entire adminis-
trative personnel, both central and local, from the President down to the
pettiest functionary, and which has subjected the State to a liability now
almost absolute, is that it has been done in the main by the decisions of
the council of state itself. The Parliament could at any time have
intervened and have prevented by legislation this extraordinary exten-
sion of judicial control and of State liability; it could have regulated
both and have fixed the limits of each, but it has not chosen to do so.
On the contrary, it has left the development of the law entirely to the
tribunals (mainly the council of state), without interference or restric-
tion of any kind, and has thus by acquiescence approved the jurispru-
dence which they have built up. Altogether it is a remarkable testi-
monial on the part of the legislature of its confidence in the administra-
tive tribunals.
